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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4992
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3646
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2128
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4296

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002527

SIPDIS

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TAGS: PREL BK EU RS

SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTIVE ON BOSNIA (C-RE9-01807)

REF: A. STATE 102233

¶B. MOSCOW 308

¶C. MOSCOW 562

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) The Ambassador on October 2 delivered reftel points to Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov, who said that he had already heard broad outlines of the proposal from EU representatives and supported the overall approach. Titov appreciated that the U.S. and Russia shared the same strategic goal, i.e., the closure of OHR and its transition to the EU. While supportive of using incentives, he cautioned that Russia might not have the same positive view of NATO membership. The GOR shared the same position as the U.S. on territories, and Russia did not oppose packaging reforms with constitutional amendments as a means to break the impasse, especially since the amendments did not go beyond compromises made in 2006. However, Titov asked for greater detail on state property disposal and constitutional reform, and he also requested a read-out of the October 8-9 session with the BiH authorities.

¶2. (C) Titov agreed that the situation in Bosnia was not yet stable and that the presence of EUFOR assisted in diffusing potential crises. He acknowledged that EUFOR's presence was an EU decision that might hinge on available resources.

¶3. (C) Titov commented that the GOR was disappointed with HR Valentin Inzko, whom he called "high-strung" (nervniy). Saying "you were more right than we were" about his abilities during appointment deliberations, he quipped that Inzko "wielded Bonn authority without authority" (Refs B and C). Titov also urged us to view Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik more favorably, calling him the U.S.' "best friend" in moving the reform process forward. He said that Dodik had the support of "his public," and the public wanted to move beyond their limbo status.

¶4. (C) Titov informed the Ambassador that, due to administrative reforms, Aleksandr Botsan-Karchenko, recently appointed Russian Ambassador to Bosnia, would not be replaced as Special Representative. Instead, Fourth European Department Director Aleksandr Alekseyev would represent the GOR at future PIC sessions. Titov revealed that FM Lavrov was tentatively planning on traveling to Sarajevo in early November, as part of a planned visit to Cyprus, and would press for BiH movement on "5 plus 2" conditions.
Beyrle